What's really disgusting
Abstract Finding something disgusting involves a particular sensuous experience and an evaluation that the thing is of little or no value. Sensuous properties such as digustingness are constituted by these two aspects, the sensuous and the evaluative. In “The Authority of Affect” (2001a), Mark J...
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ndltd-netd.ac.za-oai-union.ndltd.org-wits-oai-wiredspace.wits.ac.za-10539-71262019-05-11T03:40:56Z What's really disgusting Carman, Mary Elizabeth Affect sensuous properties Mark Johnstone dispositionalism Abstract Finding something disgusting involves a particular sensuous experience and an evaluation that the thing is of little or no value. Sensuous properties such as digustingness are constituted by these two aspects, the sensuous and the evaluative. In “The Authority of Affect” (2001a), Mark Johnston argues for a detectivist account where our affective states detect mind-independent properties of sensuous value, like disgustingness. He argues that the other two standard positions, projectivism and dispositionalism, do not account for the authority of affect or are incoherent. In this paper, I argue that he is wrong to rule out dispositionalism for being incoherent and that it does account for the authority of affect. In addition, I argue that it is best able to capture the nature of sensuous properties and that it should be the default account of the relation between sensuous properties and affect. 2009-07-28T12:14:34Z 2009-07-28T12:14:34Z 2009-07-28T12:14:34Z Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/10539/7126 en application/pdf application/pdf |
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Affect sensuous properties Mark Johnstone dispositionalism |
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Affect sensuous properties Mark Johnstone dispositionalism Carman, Mary Elizabeth What's really disgusting |
description |
Abstract
Finding something disgusting involves a particular sensuous experience and
an evaluation that the thing is of little or no value. Sensuous properties such
as digustingness are constituted by these two aspects, the sensuous and the
evaluative. In “The Authority of Affect” (2001a), Mark Johnston argues
for a detectivist account where our affective states detect mind-independent
properties of sensuous value, like disgustingness. He argues that the other
two standard positions, projectivism and dispositionalism, do not account
for the authority of affect or are incoherent. In this paper, I argue that he
is wrong to rule out dispositionalism for being incoherent and that it does
account for the authority of affect. In addition, I argue that it is best able to
capture the nature of sensuous properties and that it should be the default
account of the relation between sensuous properties and affect. |
author |
Carman, Mary Elizabeth |
author_facet |
Carman, Mary Elizabeth |
author_sort |
Carman, Mary Elizabeth |
title |
What's really disgusting |
title_short |
What's really disgusting |
title_full |
What's really disgusting |
title_fullStr |
What's really disgusting |
title_full_unstemmed |
What's really disgusting |
title_sort |
what's really disgusting |
publishDate |
2009 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10539/7126 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT carmanmaryelizabeth whatsreallydisgusting |
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1719082844392783872 |