The TAO of Special Forces: an analysis of counterinsurgency doctrine

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited === The unwillingness to correct deficiencies in current COIN Doctrine or to follow the correct methods within current doctrine will lead to continued instability and possible failure of counterinsurgency operations and governments in states wit...

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Main Authors: Donahoe, Adrian A., Reed, D. Todd, Jr.
Other Authors: Sepp, Kalev
Format: Others
Published: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School June
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10945/1597
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spelling ndltd-nps.edu-oai-calhoun.nps.edu-10945-15972017-05-24T16:07:12Z The TAO of Special Forces: an analysis of counterinsurgency doctrine Donahoe, Adrian A. Reed, D. Todd, Jr. Sepp, Kalev Arquilla, John Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Defense Analysis Insurgency Counterinsurgency Guerrilla warfare Special forces (Military science) United States Insurgency Counterinsurgency COIN Unconventional warfare Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited The unwillingness to correct deficiencies in current COIN Doctrine or to follow the correct methods within current doctrine will lead to continued instability and possible failure of counterinsurgency operations and governments in states with large Islamic populations. The conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq is insurgent in nature, therefore requires a Counterinsurgent strategy. Current US Army Doctrine focuses entirely on the Counterguerilla aspect of an insurgency, rather than viewing the insurgency in its entirety. Therefore, not only is the COIN doctrine is inadequate, it also requires an overall governing strategy which must include the engagements of both the populace, and the infrastructure of the insurgency, as well as counterforce operations against the guerillas. The entire hierarchy of COIN Doctrine is skewed in favor of the conventional units who write it. Currently all COIN operations fall under Support and Stability Operations, as do Counterguerrilla Operations in doctrinal hierarchy that is written by the US Army Infantry Branch. However, US Army Special Forces Branch writes Insurgency and Foreign Internal Defense Doctrine (COIN falls under FID for all Internal Defense and Development [IDAD] Programs). The unique qualifications of Special Forces units make them ideal for creating, developing, instituting, and commanding these operations. Special Forces soldiers are language and culturally trained to operate within these nations, and normally have habitual associations previously developed with the people and militaries of these nations. Major, United States Army June 2004 2012-03-14T17:32:24Z 2012-03-14T17:32:24Z 2004-06 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/10945/1597 This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, may not be copyrighted. xiv, 91 p. : ill. (some col.) application/pdf Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
collection NDLTD
format Others
sources NDLTD
topic Insurgency
Counterinsurgency
Guerrilla warfare
Special forces (Military science)
United States
Insurgency
Counterinsurgency
COIN
Unconventional warfare
spellingShingle Insurgency
Counterinsurgency
Guerrilla warfare
Special forces (Military science)
United States
Insurgency
Counterinsurgency
COIN
Unconventional warfare
Donahoe, Adrian A.
Reed, D. Todd, Jr.
The TAO of Special Forces: an analysis of counterinsurgency doctrine
description Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited === The unwillingness to correct deficiencies in current COIN Doctrine or to follow the correct methods within current doctrine will lead to continued instability and possible failure of counterinsurgency operations and governments in states with large Islamic populations. The conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq is insurgent in nature, therefore requires a Counterinsurgent strategy. Current US Army Doctrine focuses entirely on the Counterguerilla aspect of an insurgency, rather than viewing the insurgency in its entirety. Therefore, not only is the COIN doctrine is inadequate, it also requires an overall governing strategy which must include the engagements of both the populace, and the infrastructure of the insurgency, as well as counterforce operations against the guerillas. The entire hierarchy of COIN Doctrine is skewed in favor of the conventional units who write it. Currently all COIN operations fall under Support and Stability Operations, as do Counterguerrilla Operations in doctrinal hierarchy that is written by the US Army Infantry Branch. However, US Army Special Forces Branch writes Insurgency and Foreign Internal Defense Doctrine (COIN falls under FID for all Internal Defense and Development [IDAD] Programs). The unique qualifications of Special Forces units make them ideal for creating, developing, instituting, and commanding these operations. Special Forces soldiers are language and culturally trained to operate within these nations, and normally have habitual associations previously developed with the people and militaries of these nations. === Major, United States Army
author2 Sepp, Kalev
author_facet Sepp, Kalev
Donahoe, Adrian A.
Reed, D. Todd, Jr.
author Donahoe, Adrian A.
Reed, D. Todd, Jr.
author_sort Donahoe, Adrian A.
title The TAO of Special Forces: an analysis of counterinsurgency doctrine
title_short The TAO of Special Forces: an analysis of counterinsurgency doctrine
title_full The TAO of Special Forces: an analysis of counterinsurgency doctrine
title_fullStr The TAO of Special Forces: an analysis of counterinsurgency doctrine
title_full_unstemmed The TAO of Special Forces: an analysis of counterinsurgency doctrine
title_sort tao of special forces: an analysis of counterinsurgency doctrine
publisher Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
publishDate June
url http://hdl.handle.net/10945/1597
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