| Summary: | Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited === The Persian Gulf War introduced a new, highly effective threat in the form of the mobile short range ballistic missile (SRBM). The non-guided SCUD missile proved to be most effective in the political area as Iraq continually targeted Israel in an attempt to force them into the conflict through retaliation. Although this Iraqi objective ultimately failed, a price was paid by the Coalition forces. A significant percentage of Allied air sorties were diverted to search for fixed and mobile SCUD launch sites. The mobile launchers proved to be highly elusive as post-war analysis has shown little or no success in countering them. Post-war research and development continues to focus on the improvement of post-missile-launch tactics used during Desert Storm to counter the mobile launchers. This thesis introduces an integrated approach to the problem which stresses the inclusion of mobile launcher prosecution prior to weapon release. The general principles of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) are suggested as a structure to build an effective mobile SRBM counter effort doctrine. The benefit of pre-hostility intelligence and pre-missile-launch prosecution, the backbone of successful ASW, is revealed through an analysis of a circulation model which reflects the standard operations of a third world mobile missile launcher during hostilities. A decision model is constructed and analyzed to give insight into the development of pre-hostility intelligence policies.
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