| Summary: | This thesis proposes and analyzes mathematical descriptive models of the effect of Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Operations on the population of a nation experiencing stability operations. The model is a system of differential equations representing insurgent activity, insurgent recruiting, insurgent removal by the coalition; the population's tolerance for insurgent violence; occurrence of actions by the coalition and insurgency the population perceives as beneficial and damaging, and the resulting change in the population's support for the government. The study focuses on a single population, attempting to identify and model the first order effects of stability force actions on the population. We represent and study the effect of possible strategies by local government and external stability forces to influence popular support toward the government. We find the greatest increase in popular support occurs when the coalition concentrates on performing actions perceived by the population as beneficial and mitigating the effects of its damaging actions. When the population does not perceive insurgent actions as damaging, we find the coalition has difficulty increasing popular support for the government. Coalition cooperation with local leaders in planning and executing beneficial actions may increase the perceived effect of coalition actions the population perceives as beneficial.
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