Yemen: comparative insurgency and counterinsurgency

• Main Author: Johnson, Ryan
• Other Authors: Baylouny, Anne Marie
• Published: Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School 2015
• Online Access: http://hdl.handle.net/10945/45200

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited === Why have Yemen’s counterinsurgency and counterterrorism polices been less effective against the Huthi movement compared to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)? This paper finds that the military’s poor counterinsurgency and counterterrorism policies, the international effort to combat AQAP, the Huthi’s ability to recruit and mobilize large numbers of followers, and the Huthi leadership’s pragmatic alliances gave the Huthis the advantage over AQAP and the Republic of Yemen. Yemen faces multiple security problems. Foremost, the country faces threats from various groups including the Huthi Movement, AQAP, Hirak, and tribal elements with the Huthis recently capturing Sanaa. The country’s oil supply will soon to run out, which is the main source of government revenue. The country is still in the process of transition required by the Gulf Cooperation Council-negotiated agreement after the Arab Spring. These problems are exacerbated by corruption, social, and economic problems. Finally, state failure remains a real possibility, with the various groups battling for control. In this case, Yemen could become the next Somalia. The worse scenario for the U.S. would for Yemen to become a safe haven for a group intent on attacking U.S. citizens and interests.