| Summary: | Along this dissertation I propose to walk the reader through several macroeconomic<p>implications of information asymmetries, with a special focus on financial<p>issues. This exercise is mainly theoretical: I develop stylized models that aim<p>at capturing macroeconomic phenomena such as self-fulfilling liquidity dry-ups,<p>the rise and the fall of securitization markets, and the creation of systemic risk.<p>The dissertation consists of three chapters. The first one proposes an explanation<p>to self-fulfilling liquidity dry-ups. The second chapters proposes a formalization<p>of the concept of market discipline and an application to securitization<p>markets as risk-sharing mechanisms. The third one offers a complementary<p>analysis to the second as the rise of securitization is presented as banker optimal<p>response to strict capital constraints.<p>Two concepts that do not have unique acceptations in economics play a central<p>role in these models: liquidity and market discipline.<p>The liquidity of an asset refers to the ability for his owner to transform it into<p>current consumption goods. Secondary markets for long-term assets play thus<p>an important role with that respect. However, such markets might be illiquid due<p>to adverse selection.<p>In the first chapter, I show that: (1) when agents expect a liquidity dry-up<p>on such markets, they optimally choose to self-insure through the hoarding of<p>non-productive but liquid assets; (2) this hoarding behavior worsens adverse selection and dries up market liquidity; (3) such liquidity dry-ups are Pareto inefficient<p>equilibria; (4) the government can rule them out. Additionally, I show<p>that idiosyncratic liquidity shocks à la Diamond and Dybvig have stabilizing effects,<p>which is at odds with the banking literature. The main contribution of the<p>chapter is to show that market breakdowns due to adverse selection are highly<p>endogenous to past balance-sheet decisions.<p>I consider that agents are under market discipline when their current behavior<p>is influenced by future market outcomes. A key ingredient for market discipline<p>to be at play is that the market outcome depends on information that is observable<p>but not verifiable (that is, information that cannot be proved in court, and<p>consequently, upon which enforceable contracts cannot be based).<p>In the second chapter, after introducing this novel formalization of market<p>discipline, I ask whether securitization really contributes to better risk-sharing:<p>I compare it with other mechanisms that differ on the timing of risk-transfer. I<p>find that for securitization to be an efficient risk-sharing mechanism, it requires<p>market discipline to be strong and adverse selection not to be severe. This seems<p>to seriously restrict the set of assets that should be securitized for risk-sharing<p>motive.<p>Additionally, I show how ex-ante leverage may mitigate interim adverse selection<p>in securitization markets and therefore enhance ex-post risk-sharing. This<p>is interesting because high leverage is usually associated with “excessive” risktaking.<p>In the third chapter, I consider risk-neutral bankers facing strict capital constraints;<p>their capital is indeed required to cover the worst-case-scenario losses.<p>In such a set-up, I find that: 1) banker optimal autarky response is to diversify<p>lower-tail risk and maximize leverage; 2) securitization helps to free up capital<p>and to increase leverage, but distorts incentives to screen loan applicants properly; 3) market discipline mitigates this problem, but if it is overestimated by<p>the supervisor, it leads to excess leverage, which creates systemic risk. Finally,<p>I consider opaque securitization and I show that the supervisor: 4) faces uncertainty<p>about the trade-off between the size of the economy and the probability<p>and the severity of a systemic crisis; 5) can generally not set capital constraints<p>at the socially efficient level. === Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion === info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
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