The Role of Information Signals in Venture Investments and Performance

This dissertation aims to provide theoretical and empirical evidence on which information signals can explain venture investments and performance. The first two studies are empirical, employing film industry as the ideal setting to support the theoretical framework. A film is considered a new ventur...

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Main Author: Tomaselli, Angelo <1986>
Other Authors: Torluccio, Giuseppe
Format: Doctoral Thesis
Language:en
Published: Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna 2016
Subjects:
Online Access:http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/7278/
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spelling ndltd-unibo.it-oai-amsdottorato.cib.unibo.it-72782016-08-04T05:58:54Z The Role of Information Signals in Venture Investments and Performance Tomaselli, Angelo <1986> SECS-P/11 Economia degli intermediari finanziari This dissertation aims to provide theoretical and empirical evidence on which information signals can explain venture investments and performance. The first two studies are empirical, employing film industry as the ideal setting to support the theoretical framework. A film is considered a new venture (project-based), film producer and director are considered the core members of the new venture founding team (VFT), film’s script represents the new venture’s business idea and the distributor represents an intermediary that legitimates the VFT in the market. The first study explains how investors decrease new venture “liability of newness” through two main signals: the VFT reputation and the socio-political legitimacy of the new venture idea. I find that VFT reputation enhances the socio-political legitimacy of a new venture idea, which on its own decreases the effect of VFT reputation on attracting potential investors. The second study, combining signaling and agency theories, explore signals that determine new venture performance. Results find that VFT reputation is an agent’s “value signal” for venture investors (principals respect to a VFT) that is mediated by the investment of an intermediary in the new venture, which represents an efficient “commitment signal” to maximize the new venture performance. The intermediary considered assumes a special “dual role” in the VFT-investors’ relationship: it is an agent with respect to investors and, at the same time, it is a principal to the VFT. Finally, the third study is a literature review proposing a new operational model for established and new ventures that aim to acquire competitive advantage through three relevant signals: reputation, legitimacy and status. The model explains how managers and venture founders, through the acquisition of venture’s legitimacy and network status, could strategically affect the corporate reputation of their venture, leading it to higher societal status and greater competitive advantage. Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna Torluccio, Giuseppe 2016-05-24 Doctoral Thesis PeerReviewed application/pdf en http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/7278/ info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess info:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2017-01-30
collection NDLTD
language en
format Doctoral Thesis
sources NDLTD
topic SECS-P/11 Economia degli intermediari finanziari
spellingShingle SECS-P/11 Economia degli intermediari finanziari
Tomaselli, Angelo <1986>
The Role of Information Signals in Venture Investments and Performance
description This dissertation aims to provide theoretical and empirical evidence on which information signals can explain venture investments and performance. The first two studies are empirical, employing film industry as the ideal setting to support the theoretical framework. A film is considered a new venture (project-based), film producer and director are considered the core members of the new venture founding team (VFT), film’s script represents the new venture’s business idea and the distributor represents an intermediary that legitimates the VFT in the market. The first study explains how investors decrease new venture “liability of newness” through two main signals: the VFT reputation and the socio-political legitimacy of the new venture idea. I find that VFT reputation enhances the socio-political legitimacy of a new venture idea, which on its own decreases the effect of VFT reputation on attracting potential investors. The second study, combining signaling and agency theories, explore signals that determine new venture performance. Results find that VFT reputation is an agent’s “value signal” for venture investors (principals respect to a VFT) that is mediated by the investment of an intermediary in the new venture, which represents an efficient “commitment signal” to maximize the new venture performance. The intermediary considered assumes a special “dual role” in the VFT-investors’ relationship: it is an agent with respect to investors and, at the same time, it is a principal to the VFT. Finally, the third study is a literature review proposing a new operational model for established and new ventures that aim to acquire competitive advantage through three relevant signals: reputation, legitimacy and status. The model explains how managers and venture founders, through the acquisition of venture’s legitimacy and network status, could strategically affect the corporate reputation of their venture, leading it to higher societal status and greater competitive advantage.
author2 Torluccio, Giuseppe
author_facet Torluccio, Giuseppe
Tomaselli, Angelo <1986>
author Tomaselli, Angelo <1986>
author_sort Tomaselli, Angelo <1986>
title The Role of Information Signals in Venture Investments and Performance
title_short The Role of Information Signals in Venture Investments and Performance
title_full The Role of Information Signals in Venture Investments and Performance
title_fullStr The Role of Information Signals in Venture Investments and Performance
title_full_unstemmed The Role of Information Signals in Venture Investments and Performance
title_sort role of information signals in venture investments and performance
publisher Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna
publishDate 2016
url http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/7278/
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