The Threats to Compliance with International Human Rights Law
In this project I investigate the factors shaping compliance with international human rights agreements and I provide a definition of compliance, which goes beyond “ratification.” I argue that compliance is a multistage process, built upon three different steps: ratification/accession, implementatio...
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University of North Texas
2011
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ndltd-unt.edu-info-ark-67531-metadc1032822020-07-17T05:17:46Z The Threats to Compliance with International Human Rights Law Aloisi, Rosa Compliance Convention Against Torture human rights In this project I investigate the factors shaping compliance with international human rights agreements and I provide a definition of compliance, which goes beyond “ratification.” I argue that compliance is a multistage process, built upon three different steps: ratification/accession, implementation, and what I call “compliant behavior.” As an alternative to the dominant structural and normative explanation of compliance, I suggest that the factors affecting compliance are not only endogenous to state characteristics, such as the democratic/non-democratic nature of governments, but also exogenous, such as the perceived level of threat to national security. I offer a twofold theory that looks at leaders’ behavior under conditions of stability and instability and I suggest that under certain circumstances that threaten and pressure government leaders, state compliance with international human rights law becomes more costly. I suggest that regardless of regime type, threats shape leaders’ behavior toward international law; states are faced with the choice to abide by international obligations, protecting specific human rights, and the choice to protect their national interests. I argue that when the costs associated with compliance increase, because leaders face threats to their power and government stability, threats become the predictor of non-compliant behavior regardless of the democratic or non-democratic nature of the regime. University of North Texas Meernik, James D. Mason, T. David Booth, John A. King, Kimi Lynn 2011-12 Thesis or Dissertation Text oclc: 811841364 https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc103282/ ark: ark:/67531/metadc103282 English Public Aloisi, Rosa Copyright Copyright is held by the author, unless otherwise noted. All rights Reserved. |
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Compliance Convention Against Torture human rights Aloisi, Rosa The Threats to Compliance with International Human Rights Law |
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In this project I investigate the factors shaping compliance with international human rights agreements and I provide a definition of compliance, which goes beyond “ratification.” I argue that compliance is a multistage process, built upon three different steps: ratification/accession, implementation, and what I call “compliant behavior.” As an alternative to the dominant structural and normative explanation of compliance, I suggest that the factors affecting compliance are not only endogenous to state characteristics, such as the democratic/non-democratic nature of governments, but also exogenous, such as the perceived level of threat to national security. I offer a twofold theory that looks at leaders’ behavior under conditions of stability and instability and I suggest that under certain circumstances that threaten and pressure government leaders, state compliance with international human rights law becomes more costly. I suggest that regardless of regime type, threats shape leaders’ behavior toward international law; states are faced with the choice to abide by international obligations, protecting specific human rights, and the choice to protect their national interests. I argue that when the costs associated with compliance increase, because leaders face threats to their power and government stability, threats become the predictor of non-compliant behavior regardless of the democratic or non-democratic nature of the regime. |
author2 |
Meernik, James D. |
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Meernik, James D. Aloisi, Rosa |
author |
Aloisi, Rosa |
author_sort |
Aloisi, Rosa |
title |
The Threats to Compliance with International Human Rights Law |
title_short |
The Threats to Compliance with International Human Rights Law |
title_full |
The Threats to Compliance with International Human Rights Law |
title_fullStr |
The Threats to Compliance with International Human Rights Law |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Threats to Compliance with International Human Rights Law |
title_sort |
threats to compliance with international human rights law |
publisher |
University of North Texas |
publishDate |
2011 |
url |
https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc103282/ |
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