Is God an economist? An economic inquiry into the relationship between self and God in Judeo-Christian theology

• Main Author: Muller, Edward Nicholas, IV, 1964-
• Language: en_US
• Published: University of Oregon 2010
• Subjects: Contract; Economics of religion; Religious affiliation; Theology; Good works; God; Self; Judeo-Christian; Christian; Religion; Economics
• Online Access: http://hdl.handle.net/1794/10558

xi, 69 p. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number. === In the context of Judeo-Christian theology, I develop what appears to be the first formal economic model to analyze the joint interactions between human actors and a divine actor involved in the production of good works. Human actors are identified as trusting believers, doubting believers, or nonbelievers. The divine actor is perceived as offering four different alternative contracts, an ex ante contract without a penalty, an ex post contract, an ex ante contract with a penalty, and a covenant. Contract types are identified with specific religious affiliations. The amount of good works produced depends on the strength of faith and the contractual choices of the individual, as implied by religious affiliation. I test explicit predictions of the model using individual survey data from a nationally representative sample. My results suggest that (1) ex post contracts "work" (attendance is greater for trusting believers under ex post contracts than under ex ante contracts without a penalty); (2) strength of faith does not matter (good works are equivalent for both trusting and doubting believers under ex ante contracts); (3) penalties do not "work" for believers (attendance is no greater for believers under ex ante contracts with a penalty than under ex ante contracts without a penalty); and (4) covenants "work" (attendance is the same for believers under covenants as under ex ante contracts without a penalty). Tests focus either on the model's counterintuitive predictions for the role of strength of faith for a given contract type or on the role of religious affiliation and contract type for a given strength of faith. The tests suggest substantial power for the model's predictions. Even so, the dissertation emphasizes throughout the limitations of a purely economic analysis of the Judeo-Christian tradition and theology. === Committee in charge: Joe Stone, Co-Chairperson, Economics; Jo Anna Gray, Co-Chairperson, Economics; Larry Singell, Member, Economics; Jean Stockard, Outside Member, Planning Public Policy & Mgmt