Kantian Ethics and the Formula of Humanity: Towards Virtues and Ends
The aim of this work is to show that criticisms of Kantian ethics from the field of virtue ethics misfire because they rely on a widespread reading of Kant which centers on the Groundwork and the Formula of Universal Law as the key elements in his moral philosophy. This reading, I argue, is suscepti...
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| Language: | en |
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Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa
2013
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10393/30336 http://dx.doi.org/10.20381/ruor-3451 |
| Summary: | The aim of this work is to show that criticisms of Kantian ethics from the field of virtue ethics misfire because they rely on a widespread reading of Kant which centers on the Groundwork and the Formula of Universal Law as the key elements in his moral philosophy. This reading, I argue, is susceptible both to charges of “empty formalism” and moral “rigorism” as well as the complaint voiced by virtue ethicists that Kantian ethics lacks a full-blooded account of the virtues, along with the attendant desiderata of sociality, character and the emotions. In response, I defend the proposal that the Formula of Humanity and the Doctrine of Virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals represent the final form of Kant’s ethical thought. If this is accurate, a rich and novel ethical theory emerges, and many of the criticisms from the field of virtue ethics are subsequently disarmed. |
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