Determinantes da Compensação de Executivos

• Main Author: Vieito, João Paulo Torre
• Format: Others
• Language: Portuguese
• Published: Faculdade de Economia da Universidade do Porto 2011
• Subjects: CIÊNCIAS EMPRESARIAIS; Porto
• Online Access: http://hdl.handle.net/10216/7458

Ciências Empresariais === This dissertation consists of four parts. In the first part, we review the literature on executive compensation in the last 13 years and in the other three parts, we investigate a few critical questions in the executive compensation area as described below. We analyze whether or not the determinants, the form and total executive compensation are the same for the new versus old economy firms (first essay), NYSE and NASDAQ listed firms (second essay) and S&P500, S&PMidCap and S&PSmallCap firms (third essay). For all these three groups of firms we also analyze whether or not the NASDAQ crash in 2000 and the Sarbanes-Oxley (SO) Act in 2002 changed the structure of executive compensation. In all the cases we find that the factors that explain executive compensation are generally different. However, in a few instances of common factors the intensity of these factors (coefficients) is different and this difference is generally statistically significant. Our results also reveal that the determinants and forms of executive compensation did indeed change after the NASDAQ crash and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. === This dissertation consists of four parts. In the first part, we review the literature on executive compensation in the last 13 years and in the other three parts, we investigate a few critical questions in the executive compensation area as described below. We analyze whether or not the determinants, the form and total executive compensation are the same for the new versus old economy firms (first essay), NYSE and NASDAQ listed firms (second essay) and S&P500, S&PMidCap and S&PSmallCap firms (third essay). For all these three groups of firms we also analyze whether or not the NASDAQ crash in 2000 and the Sarbanes-Oxley (SO) Act in 2002 changed the structure of executive compensation. In all the cases we find that the factors that explain executive compensation are generally different. However, in a few instances of common factors the intensity of these factors (coefficients) is different and this difference is generally statistically significant. Our results also reveal that the determinants and forms of executive compensation did indeed change after the NASDAQ crash and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.