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10.1007-s11098-021-01690-5 |
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|a 00318116 (ISSN)
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|a Moral judgment and the content-attitude distinction
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| 260 |
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|b Springer Science and Business Media B.V.
|c 2022
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|z View Fulltext in Publisher
|u https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01690-5
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|a Let cognitivism be the view that moral judgments are cognitive mental states and noncognitivism the view that they are noncognitive mental states. Here I argue for moral judgment pluralism: some moral judgments are cognitive states and some are noncognitive states. More specifically, according to my pluralism some judgments are moral because they carry a moral content (e.g., that genocide is wrong) and some are moral because they employ a moral attitude (e.g., indignation, or guilt); the former are the cognitive moral judgments and the latter the noncognitive ones. After explaining and motivating the view, I argue that this kind of pluralism handles quite elegantly several of the core issues that have structured the debate on cognitivism versus noncognitivism. © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.
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|a Cognitivism
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|a Error theory
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| 650 |
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|a Frege–Geach problem
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|a Moral judgment
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|a Motivation
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|a Noncognitivism
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|a Kriegel, U.
|e author
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| 773 |
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|t Philosophical Studies
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