Moral judgment and the content-attitude distinction
Let cognitivism be the view that moral judgments are cognitive mental states and noncognitivism the view that they are noncognitive mental states. Here I argue for moral judgment pluralism: some moral judgments are cognitive states and some are noncognitive states. More specifically, according to my...
Main Author: | Kriegel, U. (Author) |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Springer Science and Business Media B.V.
2022
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | View Fulltext in Publisher |
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