Credal accuracy and knowledge

• Main Author: Siscoe, R.W (Author)
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Springer Science and Business Media B.V. 2022
• Subjects: Credal accuracy; Epistemic possibility; Justified belief; Knowledge; Rational norms
• Online Access: View Fulltext in Publisher

 Traditional epistemologists assumed that the most important doxastic norms were rational requirements on belief. This orthodoxy has recently been challenged by the work of revolutionary epistemologists on the rational requirements on credences. Revolutionary epistemology takes it that such contemporary work is important precisely because traditional epistemologists are mistaken—credal norms are more fundamental than, and determinative of, belief norms. To make sense of their innovative project, many revolutionary epistemologists have also adopted another commitment, that norms on credences are governed by a fundamental accuracy norm. Unfortunately for the revolutionary epistemologist, it has been difficult to define a measure of accuracy while maintaining that credal norms are more basic than belief norms. In this paper, I criticize one such proposal for measuring accuracy, that the accuracy of our credences should be assessed in terms of what we know, arguing that this picture ultimately cannot vindicate the revolutionary approach. © 2022, The Author(s).