An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) proposed a model of a competitive market with adverse selection and showed that a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium may not exist. Among the solutions proposed to deal with this problem, a particularly influential one is the notion of Riley (or reactive) equilibrium (Ri...
Main Authors: | Azevedo, E.M (Author), Gottlieb, D. (Author) |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Academic Press Inc.
2019
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | View Fulltext in Publisher |
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