Replicator dynamics for the game theoretic selection models based on state

• Main Authors: Argasinski, K. (Author), Rudnicki, R. (Author)
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Academic Press 2021
• Subjects: adaptive behavior; age structure; Age-structured population; aging; article; Biological Evolution; Columbidae; demography; evolution; Evolutionary game; evolutionary theory; feedback system; game; game theory; Game Theory; growth inhibition; human; Humans; Infant, Newborn; Models, Theoretical; nest site; newborn; nonhuman; Owner-Intruder game; population dynamics; Population Dynamics; population growth; Population Growth; Replicator dynamics; role change; Stage-structured population; State-based models; theoretical model
• Online Access: View Fulltext in Publisher

 The paper presents an attempt to integrate the classical evolutionary game theory based on replicator dynamics and the state-based approach of Houston and McNamara. In the new approach, individuals have different heritable strategies; however, individuals carrying the same strategy can differ in terms of state, role or the situation in which they act. Thus, the classical replicator dynamics is completed by the additional subsystem of differential equations describing the dynamics of transitions between different states. In effect, the interactions described by game structure, in addition to the demographic payoffs (constituted by births and deaths), can lead to the change in state of the competing individuals. Special cases of reversible and irreversible incremental stage-structured models, where the state changes can describe energy accumulation, developmental steps or aging, are derived for discrete and continuous versions. The new approach is illustrated using the example of the Owner-Intruder game with explicit dynamics of the role changes. The new model presents a generalization of the demographic version of the Hawk-Dove game, with the difference being that the opponents in the game are drawn from two separate subpopulations consisting of Owners and Intruders. Here, the Intruders check random nest sites and play the Hawk-Dove game with the Owner if they are occupied. Meanwhile, the Owners produce newborns that become Intruders, since they must find a free nest site to reproduce. An interesting feedback mechanism is produced via the fluxes of individuals between the different subpopulations. In addition, the population growth suppression mechanism resulting from the fixation Bourgeois strategy is analyzed. © 2020