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01132nam a2200229Ia 4500 |
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10.1017-S0140525X20001399 |
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|a 0140525X (ISSN)
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|a Why is knowledge faster than (true) belief?
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|b Cambridge University Press
|c 2021
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|z View Fulltext in Publisher
|u https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X20001399
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|a Phillips and colleagues convincingly argue that knowledge attribution is a faster, more automatic form of mindreading than belief attribution. However, they do not explain what it is about knowledge attribution that lends it this cognitive advantage. I suggest an explanation of the knowledge-attribution advantage that would also help to distinguish it from belief-based and minimalist alternatives. Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press.
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|a article
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|a human
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|a human experiment
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|a Humans
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|a knowledge
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|a Knowledge
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|a perception
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|a Social Perception
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|a Westra, E.
|e author
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|t Behavioral and Brain Sciences
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