|
|
|
|
LEADER |
01343nam a2200157Ia 4500 |
001 |
10.1111-1756-2171.12269 |
008 |
220511s2019 CNT 000 0 und d |
020 |
|
|
|a 07416261 (ISSN)
|
245 |
1 |
0 |
|a Sticking points: common-agency problems and contracting in the US healthcare system
|
260 |
|
0 |
|b Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
|c 2019
|
856 |
|
|
|z View Fulltext in Publisher
|u https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12269
|
520 |
3 |
|
|a We propose a “common-agency” model for explaining inefficient contracting in the US healthcare system. Common-agency problems arise when multiple payers seek to motivate a provider to invest in improved care coordination. We highlight the possibility of “sticking points,” that is, Pareto-dominated equilibria in which payers coordinate around contracts which give weak incentives to the provider. Sticking points rationalize three hard-to-explain features of the US healthcare system: widespread fee-for-service arrangements; problematic care coordination; and the historical reliance on single-specialty practices to deliver care. The model also analyzes the effects of policies promoting more efficient contracting between payers and providers. © 2019, The RAND Corporation.
|
700 |
1 |
|
|a Frandsen, B.
|e author
|
700 |
1 |
|
|a Powell, M.
|e author
|
700 |
1 |
|
|a Rebitzer, J.B.
|e author
|
773 |
|
|
|t RAND Journal of Economics
|