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| LEADER |
01167nam a2200133Ia 4500 |
| 001 |
10.1111-joie.12202 |
| 008 |
220511s2019 CNT 000 0 und d |
| 020 |
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|a 00221821 (ISSN)
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| 245 |
1 |
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|a Resident Bid Preference, Affiliation, and Procurement Competition: Evidence from New Mexico
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| 260 |
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|b Blackwell Publishing Ltd
|c 2019
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| 856 |
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|z View Fulltext in Publisher
|u https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12202
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| 520 |
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|a In public procurement auctions, governments routinely offer preferences to qualified firms in the form of bid discounts. Previous studies on bid discounting do not account for affiliation – a form of cost dependence between bidders that is likely to occur in a public procurement environment. Utilizing data from the New Mexico Department of Transportation’s Resident Preference Program, I develop and estimate an empirical model of firm bidding and entry that allows for affiliation in firms’ project costs. I find evidence of affiliation and show how it changes preference auction outcomes. © 2019 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Rosa, B.V.
|e author
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| 773 |
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|t Journal of Industrial Economics
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