Kelsen’s Metaethics

In this article, I argue, inter alia, that Kelsen’s mature view—as expressed in, and around the time of, the second edition of Reine Rechtslehre—was that of a metaethical relativist, and that the commitment to metaethical relativism was the reason why Kelsen defended democracy as well as tolerance i...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Spaak, T. (Author)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: John Wiley and Sons Inc 2022
Online Access:View Fulltext in Publisher
LEADER 01119nam a2200133Ia 4500
001 10.1111-raju.12343
008 220630s2022 CNT 000 0 und d
020 |a 09521917 (ISSN) 
245 1 0 |a Kelsen’s Metaethics 
260 0 |b John Wiley and Sons Inc  |c 2022 
520 3 |a In this article, I argue, inter alia, that Kelsen’s mature view—as expressed in, and around the time of, the second edition of Reine Rechtslehre—was that of a metaethical relativist, and that the commitment to metaethical relativism was the reason why Kelsen defended democracy as well as tolerance in the shape of a constitutionally guaranteed freedom of thought. I also consider the possibility that in his post-1960 phase Kelsen abandoned metaethical relativism for moral fictionalism, but argue that, on the whole, a relativist interpretation of Kelsen’s late legal philosophy is to be preferred to a fictionalist interpretation. © 2022 The Author. Ratio Juris published by University of Bologna and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
700 1 0 |a Spaak, T.  |e author 
773 |t Ratio Juris 
856 |z View Fulltext in Publisher  |u https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12343