Kelsen’s Metaethics
In this article, I argue, inter alia, that Kelsen’s mature view—as expressed in, and around the time of, the second edition of Reine Rechtslehre—was that of a metaethical relativist, and that the commitment to metaethical relativism was the reason why Kelsen defended democracy as well as tolerance i...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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John Wiley and Sons Inc
2022
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Online Access: | View Fulltext in Publisher |
LEADER | 01119nam a2200133Ia 4500 | ||
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001 | 10.1111-raju.12343 | ||
008 | 220630s2022 CNT 000 0 und d | ||
020 | |a 09521917 (ISSN) | ||
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Kelsen’s Metaethics |
260 | 0 | |b John Wiley and Sons Inc |c 2022 | |
520 | 3 | |a In this article, I argue, inter alia, that Kelsen’s mature view—as expressed in, and around the time of, the second edition of Reine Rechtslehre—was that of a metaethical relativist, and that the commitment to metaethical relativism was the reason why Kelsen defended democracy as well as tolerance in the shape of a constitutionally guaranteed freedom of thought. I also consider the possibility that in his post-1960 phase Kelsen abandoned metaethical relativism for moral fictionalism, but argue that, on the whole, a relativist interpretation of Kelsen’s late legal philosophy is to be preferred to a fictionalist interpretation. © 2022 The Author. Ratio Juris published by University of Bologna and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. | |
700 | 1 | 0 | |a Spaak, T. |e author |
773 | |t Ratio Juris | ||
856 | |z View Fulltext in Publisher |u https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12343 |