Study on Design Optimization in Major Railway Projects with Fair Preference Based on Stackelberg Game

A contractor proposes design changes to achieve design optimization in the design stage of major railway projects, which can effectively solve problems such as project cost overruns. In order to promote cooperation between the construction party and the owner in the design stage, the fairness prefer...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Kou, Y. (Author), Liu, K. (Author), Liu, Y. (Author), Zhao, X. (Author)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Hindawi Limited 2022
Subjects:
Online Access:View Fulltext in Publisher
Description
Summary:A contractor proposes design changes to achieve design optimization in the design stage of major railway projects, which can effectively solve problems such as project cost overruns. In order to promote cooperation between the construction party and the owner in the design stage, the fairness preference theory was introduced. Based on the relationship characteristics of project participants in a major railway project, a Stackelberg game model between the owner and contractor was established. The influence of fairness preference psychology on both parties' decision-making behavior and utility changes was discussed. MATLAB software is used to perform numerical simulation analysis on the evolution results of the game model. The research results show the following: The project gain distribution coefficient of the owner and contractor will increase with the increase in their fairness perception strength. The acceptance rate of design changes will decrease with the increase in the contractor's fairness perception strength, and the owner's fairness perception intensity has no effect on the acceptance rate of design changes. When only one party has a fairness preference psychology, the project gain distribution coefficient will tilt towards that party. Fairness preference psychology can change the utility of the owner and contractor and narrow the utility gap between two parties. © 2022 Kai Liu et al.
ISBN:1024123X (ISSN)
DOI:10.1155/2022/5336591