| Summary: | A motive for this paper was a series of papers by Vittorio Gallese (Gallese, 2014; Gallese, 2016). While developing his Embodied Simulation Theory, Gallese argued in favor of paradeigma (example, rhetoric argument based on parallel cases) as a naturalization of embodied simulation. In my opinion, this rhetoric argument is based on a fundamental cognitive procedure best understood in terms of Husserl’s analogizing apperception. In an introductory section, I briefly characterize the motivating ideas of Gallese and introduce the conception of neurophenomenology that I adhere to. The second section describes Aristotle’s interpretation of paradeigma and a related conception of first principle grasping presented in Prior and Posterior Analytics. The third section contains an examination of the logical structure of paradeigma as a non-deductive argument. In the forth section, I propose a novel reconstruction of both paradeigma and underlying fundamental cognitive procedure involved in first principles grasping based upon the phenomenological conception of apperceptive transfer of sense. The conclusion recaps on the work done and indicates prospective avenues of future research. © 2020, Universidad Diego Portales. All rights reserved.
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