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|a Although local governments have issued relevant reward and penalty policies, there are still problems of medical waste disposal in China, particularly in light of the special situation of the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, these problems are generated in the game between local governments and disposal enterprises. Accordingly, based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper establishes and analyzes the game system between local governments and disposal enterprises under four modes: static reward and static penalty, dynamic reward and static penalty, static reward and dynamic penalty, and dynamic reward and dynamic penalty. The theoretical analysis is verified through numerical simulation of a medical waste disposal case in China. The results showed that when local governments choose the static reward and static penalty mode, the game system hardly always has an evolutionary stable state, and the dynamic reward or dynamic penalty mode can make up for the shortcomings of the static reward and static penalty mode. The static reward and dynamic penalty mode is considerably better than the other two dynamic reward and penalty modes, which has the best effect on improving the quality of medical waste disposal. Additionally, if the reward or penalty increases dynamically, local governments tend to implement a “relaxed supervision” strategy, and disposal enterprises will still improve the disposal quality of medical waste. The suggestions proposed based on the research conclusions offer some enlightenment for policymakers to formulate reasonable reward and penalty measures. © 2022 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
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