Multidimensional Screening with Complementary Activities: Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Cost and Unknown Preference for Empire Building

Multidimensional Screening with Complementary Activities: Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Cost and Unknown Preference for Empire Building

We study the optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empire building tendency (marginal utility of output) are private information, but actual cost (the difference between intrinsic cost and effort level) is observable. This is a problem of multidimensional...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Didier Laussel, Ana Pinto Borges, João Correia-da-Silva
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2013-09-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
multidimensional screening
regulation
procurement
empire building
adverse selection
Online Access:http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/4/3/532

Internet

http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/4/3/532

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