Bidding to Commit

Economists and biologists have both theorized that individuals can benefit from committing to courses of action because it forces others to concede a greater share of any surpluses, but little experimental work has tested the actual benefits of such a strategy and people’s willingness to so “tie the...

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Main Author: Pat Barclay
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: SAGE Publishing 2017-02-01
Series:Evolutionary Psychology
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1177/1474704917690740
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spelling doaj-20f93ca7d4fc4fdb96b67d0061b34c482020-11-25T03:43:20ZengSAGE PublishingEvolutionary Psychology1474-70492017-02-011510.1177/147470491769074010.1177_1474704917690740Bidding to CommitPat Barclay0 Department of Psychology, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, CanadaEconomists and biologists have both theorized that individuals can benefit from committing to courses of action because it forces others to concede a greater share of any surpluses, but little experimental work has tested the actual benefits of such a strategy and people’s willingness to so “tie their hands.” Participants played a Battle-of-the-Sexes (Experiment 1) or Hawk–Dove game (Experiment 2), where one member of each pair could not change his or her action once played (committed), whereas the other could change actions in response (uncommitted). Committed players were more likely to achieve their preferred outcomes. When bidding to select roles, most participants preferred to be committed rather than uncommitted, though they bid slightly less than the committed role was actually worth. These results provide empirical support for people’s willingness to use commitment to their advantage and show that commitment devices (e.g., “irrational” emotions) can bring long-term benefits.https://doi.org/10.1177/1474704917690740
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Pat Barclay
spellingShingle Pat Barclay
Bidding to Commit
Evolutionary Psychology
author_facet Pat Barclay
author_sort Pat Barclay
title Bidding to Commit
title_short Bidding to Commit
title_full Bidding to Commit
title_fullStr Bidding to Commit
title_full_unstemmed Bidding to Commit
title_sort bidding to commit
publisher SAGE Publishing
series Evolutionary Psychology
issn 1474-7049
publishDate 2017-02-01
description Economists and biologists have both theorized that individuals can benefit from committing to courses of action because it forces others to concede a greater share of any surpluses, but little experimental work has tested the actual benefits of such a strategy and people’s willingness to so “tie their hands.” Participants played a Battle-of-the-Sexes (Experiment 1) or Hawk–Dove game (Experiment 2), where one member of each pair could not change his or her action once played (committed), whereas the other could change actions in response (uncommitted). Committed players were more likely to achieve their preferred outcomes. When bidding to select roles, most participants preferred to be committed rather than uncommitted, though they bid slightly less than the committed role was actually worth. These results provide empirical support for people’s willingness to use commitment to their advantage and show that commitment devices (e.g., “irrational” emotions) can bring long-term benefits.
url https://doi.org/10.1177/1474704917690740
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