The Incompatibility of Pareto Optimality and Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatibility in Sufficiently-Anonymous Budget-Constrained Quasilinear Settings

The Incompatibility of Pareto Optimality and Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatibility in Sufficiently-Anonymous Budget-Constrained Quasilinear Settings

We analyze the space of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individually rational and Pareto optimal combinatorial auctions. We examine a model with multidimensional types, nonidentical items, private values and quasilinear preferences for the players with one relaxation; the play...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Rica Gonen, Anat Lerner
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2013-11-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
budget constraints
Pareto efficiency
incentive compatibility
Online Access:http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/4/4/690

Internet

http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/4/4/690

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