LOOKING AT HRM THROUGH THE LENS OF AGENCY THEORY – ARE SUBOPTIMAL HRM PRACTICES A CONSEQUENCE OF MORAL HAZARD?
The aim of the paper is to provide theoretical evidence that agency problems do exist and could cause under-performance in the HRM area, but as well to systematize and elaborate HRM control systems which reduce agents’ moral hazard in general, and especially when making HRM decisions. A substantia...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Slovenian Academy of Management
2016-11-01
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| Series: | Dynamic Relationships Management Journal (DRMJ) |
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| Online Access: | http://sam-d.si/revija/looking-at-hrm-through-the-lens-of-agency-theory-are-suboptimal-hrm-practices-a-consequence-of-moral-hazard-2/ |