Optimal emission control under public port rivalry: A comparison of competitive and cooperative policy
This study examines the optimal emission control at two competing public ports. We first develop a two-stage duopoly model in which governments determine the emission standard that restrains shipping operators’ fuel quality and ports are involved in price competition, taking the emission standards a...
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2020-01-01
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doaj-4f16a99c4ccc48bdad5d8ca2b886b0c32021-05-04T07:34:08ZengElsevierMaritime Transport Research2666-822X2020-01-011100005Optimal emission control under public port rivalry: A comparison of competitive and cooperative policyKevin Hyosoo Park0Young-Tae Chang1Jasmine Siu Lee Lam2Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USAGraduate School of Logistics, Inha University, Incheon, Korea & Korea Maritime Institute, Busan, Republic of KoreaSchool of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore; Corresponding author.This study examines the optimal emission control at two competing public ports. We first develop a two-stage duopoly model in which governments determine the emission standard that restrains shipping operators’ fuel quality and ports are involved in price competition, taking the emission standards as given. Then, non-cooperative and cooperative emission control cases are analyzed. The main result of this study is surprising. The results suggest that shipping operators bear fuel cost, congestion externality cost, and port price. The port price comprises markups from market power, congestion externality, and emission externality cost. Regardless of cooperation and governments’ knowledge of port pricing, the emission standard is optimal if and only if shipping operators’ fuel cost equals the emission externality cost.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666822X20300058Emission controlPublic portsPort competitionNegative externalityPort pricing |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Kevin Hyosoo Park Young-Tae Chang Jasmine Siu Lee Lam |
spellingShingle |
Kevin Hyosoo Park Young-Tae Chang Jasmine Siu Lee Lam Optimal emission control under public port rivalry: A comparison of competitive and cooperative policy Maritime Transport Research Emission control Public ports Port competition Negative externality Port pricing |
author_facet |
Kevin Hyosoo Park Young-Tae Chang Jasmine Siu Lee Lam |
author_sort |
Kevin Hyosoo Park |
title |
Optimal emission control under public port rivalry: A comparison of competitive and cooperative policy |
title_short |
Optimal emission control under public port rivalry: A comparison of competitive and cooperative policy |
title_full |
Optimal emission control under public port rivalry: A comparison of competitive and cooperative policy |
title_fullStr |
Optimal emission control under public port rivalry: A comparison of competitive and cooperative policy |
title_full_unstemmed |
Optimal emission control under public port rivalry: A comparison of competitive and cooperative policy |
title_sort |
optimal emission control under public port rivalry: a comparison of competitive and cooperative policy |
publisher |
Elsevier |
series |
Maritime Transport Research |
issn |
2666-822X |
publishDate |
2020-01-01 |
description |
This study examines the optimal emission control at two competing public ports. We first develop a two-stage duopoly model in which governments determine the emission standard that restrains shipping operators’ fuel quality and ports are involved in price competition, taking the emission standards as given. Then, non-cooperative and cooperative emission control cases are analyzed. The main result of this study is surprising. The results suggest that shipping operators bear fuel cost, congestion externality cost, and port price. The port price comprises markups from market power, congestion externality, and emission externality cost. Regardless of cooperation and governments’ knowledge of port pricing, the emission standard is optimal if and only if shipping operators’ fuel cost equals the emission externality cost. |
topic |
Emission control Public ports Port competition Negative externality Port pricing |
url |
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666822X20300058 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT kevinhyosoopark optimalemissioncontrolunderpublicportrivalryacomparisonofcompetitiveandcooperativepolicy AT youngtaechang optimalemissioncontrolunderpublicportrivalryacomparisonofcompetitiveandcooperativepolicy AT jasminesiuleelam optimalemissioncontrolunderpublicportrivalryacomparisonofcompetitiveandcooperativepolicy |
_version_ |
1721479725750157312 |