Designing a Revenue Sharing Contract under Information Asymmetry

In a supply chain coordinated by a revenue sharing contract, under-reporting of sales revenue has been a common practice amongst retailers who always have private information about the market demand. In this article, we aim to design a mechanism to mitigate this problem. One may design a contract to...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Jaimini Bhattacharyya, Rahul R. Marathe, G. Srinivasan
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: International Journal of Mathematical, Engineering and Management Sciences 2020-10-01
Series:International Journal of Mathematical, Engineering and Management Sciences
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.ijmems.in/volumes/volume5/number5/64-IJMEMS-20-56-5-5-820-834-2020.pdf