Contract Design for Enhancing Green Food Material Production Effort with Asymmetric Supply Cost Information

In order to improve green performance and achieve sustainability goals, food companies see the need to adopt green supply chain management. However, ensuring a green supply is a tough task since food companies do not always have full information of their suppliers’ efforts in improving the...

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Main Authors: Xiaoying Li, Qinghua Zhu
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2020-03-01
Series:Sustainability
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/5/2119
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spelling doaj-63419d0a83f449b4accaa3000ce012b22020-11-25T02:15:56ZengMDPI AGSustainability2071-10502020-03-01125211910.3390/su12052119su12052119Contract Design for Enhancing Green Food Material Production Effort with Asymmetric Supply Cost InformationXiaoying Li0Qinghua Zhu1College of Tourism, Dalian University, Dalian 116622, ChinaAntai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 1954 Huashan Road, Shanghai 200030, ChinaIn order to improve green performance and achieve sustainability goals, food companies see the need to adopt green supply chain management. However, ensuring a green supply is a tough task since food companies do not always have full information of their suppliers’ efforts in improving their green performance. This information asymmetry issue will lead the food producers to make poor decisions and cause a profit loss. Therefore, to fill this research gap, this study investigates a two-stage supply chain, which consists of one dominated food producer and a food supplier who has private knowledge of its green food material producing (GFMP) cost. To figure out how green performance is the major parameter that influences the decision-making of supply chain members under information asymmetry, this study first expands demand functions for both a food supplier and a producer, considering their influence on the green degree of the food products and associated consumer acceptance. It is found that under certain conditions, information sharing will improve the supplier’s green performance and increase the food producer’s profit. This study then presents the prerequisite of green cost information sharing by the food supplier. Furthermore, a newly designed menu of contracts, which combine the wholesale price contract and cost sharing contract, is proposed for the asymmetric information case to incentivize the food supplier to disclose the green effort information and improve the environmental and economic performance of the food supply chain. Numerical experiments are conducted through a case analysis to illustrate and validate the proposed models.https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/5/2119green supply chaininformation asymmetrycontract designcost sharing contractfood supply chain
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Xiaoying Li
Qinghua Zhu
spellingShingle Xiaoying Li
Qinghua Zhu
Contract Design for Enhancing Green Food Material Production Effort with Asymmetric Supply Cost Information
Sustainability
green supply chain
information asymmetry
contract design
cost sharing contract
food supply chain
author_facet Xiaoying Li
Qinghua Zhu
author_sort Xiaoying Li
title Contract Design for Enhancing Green Food Material Production Effort with Asymmetric Supply Cost Information
title_short Contract Design for Enhancing Green Food Material Production Effort with Asymmetric Supply Cost Information
title_full Contract Design for Enhancing Green Food Material Production Effort with Asymmetric Supply Cost Information
title_fullStr Contract Design for Enhancing Green Food Material Production Effort with Asymmetric Supply Cost Information
title_full_unstemmed Contract Design for Enhancing Green Food Material Production Effort with Asymmetric Supply Cost Information
title_sort contract design for enhancing green food material production effort with asymmetric supply cost information
publisher MDPI AG
series Sustainability
issn 2071-1050
publishDate 2020-03-01
description In order to improve green performance and achieve sustainability goals, food companies see the need to adopt green supply chain management. However, ensuring a green supply is a tough task since food companies do not always have full information of their suppliers’ efforts in improving their green performance. This information asymmetry issue will lead the food producers to make poor decisions and cause a profit loss. Therefore, to fill this research gap, this study investigates a two-stage supply chain, which consists of one dominated food producer and a food supplier who has private knowledge of its green food material producing (GFMP) cost. To figure out how green performance is the major parameter that influences the decision-making of supply chain members under information asymmetry, this study first expands demand functions for both a food supplier and a producer, considering their influence on the green degree of the food products and associated consumer acceptance. It is found that under certain conditions, information sharing will improve the supplier’s green performance and increase the food producer’s profit. This study then presents the prerequisite of green cost information sharing by the food supplier. Furthermore, a newly designed menu of contracts, which combine the wholesale price contract and cost sharing contract, is proposed for the asymmetric information case to incentivize the food supplier to disclose the green effort information and improve the environmental and economic performance of the food supply chain. Numerical experiments are conducted through a case analysis to illustrate and validate the proposed models.
topic green supply chain
information asymmetry
contract design
cost sharing contract
food supply chain
url https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/5/2119
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