Por qué la aposterioridad no (basta, según Kripke, ni) basta* (Why Aposteriority Is Not (Enough according to Kripke, Nor Is) Enough)
Kripke famously argued that the illusion of contingency cannot be explained away, in the case of consciousness, in the way it is explained away in the rest of familiar cases of necessary aposteriori statements. In a recent paper, Pérez Otero (2002) argues that there is an alternative way of explaini...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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University of the Basque Country
2010-01-01
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Series: | THEORIA : an International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science |
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Online Access: | http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/519 |