Por qué la aposterioridad no (basta, según Kripke, ni) basta* (Why Aposteriority Is Not (Enough according to Kripke, Nor Is) Enough)

Kripke famously argued that the illusion of contingency cannot be explained away, in the case of consciousness, in the way it is explained away in the rest of familiar cases of necessary aposteriori statements. In a recent paper, Pérez Otero (2002) argues that there is an alternative way of explaini...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Dan LÓPEZ DE SA
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of the Basque Country 2010-01-01
Series:THEORIA : an International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/519