The effect of incentive structure on search in the secretary problem

We tested the effectiveness of performance-based incentive structures using three incentive structures --- commission base, best only and flat fee --- and two levels of context --- no context and house-selling --- in an experiment in which participants made decisions in a variant of the secretary pr...

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Main Authors: Yu-Chin Hsiao, Simon Kemp
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Society for Judgment and Decision Making 2020-01-01
Series:Judgment and Decision Making
Subjects:
Online Access:http://journal.sjdm.org/19/190423/jdm190423.pdf
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spelling doaj-89a06e6cd8a8428caa237b3284def5592021-05-02T21:57:50ZengSociety for Judgment and Decision MakingJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752020-01-011518292The effect of incentive structure on search in the secretary problemYu-Chin HsiaoSimon KempWe tested the effectiveness of performance-based incentive structures using three incentive structures --- commission base, best only and flat fee --- and two levels of context --- no context and house-selling --- in an experiment in which participants made decisions in a variant of the secretary problem. Key measures of performance were the amount of search and the rounds in which the very best (optimal) offer was chosen. We found that having a commission-based proportional incentive did not produce better performance than having a flat payment for any of the performance measures considered. However, another performance-based incentive --- the best only --- increased the length of their searches and led to more optimal offers. These results applied both when there was no context and when the context was selling a house.http://journal.sjdm.org/19/190423/jdm190423.pdfsequential decision-making secretary problem incentive contextnakeywords
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Yu-Chin Hsiao
Simon Kemp
spellingShingle Yu-Chin Hsiao
Simon Kemp
The effect of incentive structure on search in the secretary problem
Judgment and Decision Making
sequential decision-making
secretary problem
incentive
contextnakeywords
author_facet Yu-Chin Hsiao
Simon Kemp
author_sort Yu-Chin Hsiao
title The effect of incentive structure on search in the secretary problem
title_short The effect of incentive structure on search in the secretary problem
title_full The effect of incentive structure on search in the secretary problem
title_fullStr The effect of incentive structure on search in the secretary problem
title_full_unstemmed The effect of incentive structure on search in the secretary problem
title_sort effect of incentive structure on search in the secretary problem
publisher Society for Judgment and Decision Making
series Judgment and Decision Making
issn 1930-2975
publishDate 2020-01-01
description We tested the effectiveness of performance-based incentive structures using three incentive structures --- commission base, best only and flat fee --- and two levels of context --- no context and house-selling --- in an experiment in which participants made decisions in a variant of the secretary problem. Key measures of performance were the amount of search and the rounds in which the very best (optimal) offer was chosen. We found that having a commission-based proportional incentive did not produce better performance than having a flat payment for any of the performance measures considered. However, another performance-based incentive --- the best only --- increased the length of their searches and led to more optimal offers. These results applied both when there was no context and when the context was selling a house.
topic sequential decision-making
secretary problem
incentive
contextnakeywords
url http://journal.sjdm.org/19/190423/jdm190423.pdf
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