Acyclic-and-Asymmetric Payoff Triplet Refinement of Pure Strategy Efficient Nash Equilibria in Trimatrix Games by Maximinimin and Superoptimality
Background. A problem of selecting amongst efficient Nash equilibria is solved by refining them. The existing approaches to refining do not guarantee that the refined efficient Nash equilibrium will be single. Nevertheless, a novel approach to refining pure strategy efficient Nash equilibria in bima...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute
2018-09-01
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| Series: | Наукові вісті Національного технічного університету України "Київський політехнічний інститут" |
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| Online Access: | http://bulletin.kpi.ua/article/view/131696 |