Impossibility theorems with countably many individuals

Impossibility theorems with countably many individuals

Abstract The problem of social choice is studied on a domain with countably many individuals. In contrast to most of the existing literature which establish either non-constructive possibilities or approximate (i.e. invisible) dictators, we show that if one adds a continuity property to the usual se...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Uuganbaatar Ninjbat
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: SpringerOpen 2018-07-01
Series:SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association
Subjects:
Arrow’s impossibility theorem
The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem
Infinite society
Continuity
Online Access:http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13209-018-0182-4

Internet

http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13209-018-0182-4

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