(In)accurate Intuition: Fast Reasoning in Decision Making

(In)accurate Intuition: Fast Reasoning in Decision Making

<p>Dual-process theories postulate a distinction between fast, automatic, intuitive and error-prone (Type 1) versus slow, controlled, deliberate and analytic (Type 2) processes. When less time is available, performance is predicted to be based on low-effort Type 1 processes, which leads to an...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Michalina Andrzejewska, Dilara Berkay, Sophie Dreesmann, Jonas Haslbeck, Daisy Mechelmans, Sarah Furlan
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: European Federation of Psychology Students' Associations 2013-09-01
Series:Journal of European Psychology Students
Subjects:
decision-making, dual-process theories, fast reasoning, individual differences
Online Access:https://jeps.efpsa.org/articles/239

Internet

https://jeps.efpsa.org/articles/239

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