Supply chain coordination via a two-part tariff contract with price and sales effort dependent demand
This paper studies the channel coordination between a supplier and a retailer with price and sales effort dependent demand. By means of game theory, we analyze price and sales effort decisions of the centralized supply chain. Then we consider three different contracts under decentralized model, i.e....
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Growing Science
2015-01-01
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| Series: | Decision Science Letters |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.growingscience.com/dsl/Vol4/dsl_2014_35.pdf |
| Summary: | This paper studies the channel coordination between a supplier and a retailer with price and sales effort dependent demand. By means of game theory, we analyze price and sales effort decisions of the centralized supply chain. Then we consider three different contracts under decentralized model, i.e., wholesale price contract, cost-sharing contract and a two-part tariff contract, in which the supplier offers a contract comprising a wholesale price and a lump-sum fee to the retailer to coordinate the supply chain. Finally, we analyze the results to compare the equilibrium decisions under different contract scenarios. Our results show that both the wholesale price contract and the cost-sharing contract cannot coordinate the supply chain while the two-part tariff contract can effectively coordinate the supply chain. |
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| ISSN: | 1929-5804 1929-5812 |