Information Use and the Condorcet Jury Theorem

Information Use and the Condorcet Jury Theorem

Using a simple model of a coordination game, this paper explores how the information use of individuals affects an optimal committee size. Although enlarging the committee promotes information aggregation, it also stimulates the members’ coordination motive and distorts their voting behavior through...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Keiichi Morimoto
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2021-05-01
Series:Mathematics
Subjects:
Condorcet jury theorem
committee
coordination game
higher-order belief
monetary policy
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/9/10/1098

Internet

https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/9/10/1098

Similar Items