Mechanism Design via Optimal Transport

Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings [Cai et al. 2012b, as long as each bidder's type distribution is given explicitly by listing every type in the support along with its associated probability. In the implicit setting, e.g. when the bidders have additive v...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Daskalakis, Konstantinos (Contributor), Deckelbaum, Alan (Contributor), Tzamos, Christos (Contributor)
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (Contributor), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mathematics (Contributor)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), 2015-11-24T15:11:53Z.
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