A Secure and Fair Protocol that Addresses Weaknesses of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Nonlinear Negotiation

Negotiation with multiple interdependent issues is an important problem since much of real-world negotiation falls into this category. This paper examines the problem that, in such domains, agent utility functions are nonlinear, and thereby can create nonconvex Pareto frontiers. This in turn implies...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Fujita, Katsuhide (Contributor), Ito, Takayuki (Contributor), Klein, Mark (Contributor)
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Collective Intelligence (Contributor), Sloan School of Management (Contributor)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Springer Netherlands, 2016-12-09T18:11:36Z.
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