Robustly Leveraging Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions

Because of its devastating effects in auctions and other mechanisms, collusion is prohibited and legally prosecuted. Yet, colluders have always existed, and may continue to exist. We thus raise the following question for mechanism design: What desiderata are achievable, and by what type of mechanism...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Chen, Jing (Contributor), Micali, Silvio (Contributor), Valiant, Paul (Contributor)
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (Contributor), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (Contributor)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Institute for Theoretical Computer Science, Tsinghua University, 2011-05-04T18:24:58Z.
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