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|a Ashlagi, Itai
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|a Sloan School of Management
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|a Ashlagi, Itai
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|a Monderer, Dov
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|a Tennenholtz, Moshe
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|a Simultaneous Ad Auctions
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|b Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS),
|c 2012-11-08T15:24:26Z.
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|z Get fulltext
|u http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/74596
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|a We consider a model with two simultaneous VCG ad auctions A and B where each advertiser chooses to participate in a single ad auction. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium in that model. Moreover, when the click rates in A are pointwise higher than those in B, we prove that the expected revenue in A is greater than the expected revenue in B in this equilibrium. In contrast, we show that this revenue ranking does not hold when advertisers can participate in both auctions.
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|a en_US
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|a Article
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|t Mathematics of Operations Research
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