Simultaneous Ad Auctions

Simultaneous Ad Auctions

We consider a model with two simultaneous VCG ad auctions A and B where each advertiser chooses to participate in a single ad auction. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium in that model. Moreover, when the click rates in A are pointwise higher than those in B, we prove th...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Ashlagi, Itai (Contributor), Monderer, Dov (Author), Tennenholtz, Moshe (Author)
Other Authors: Sloan School of Management (Contributor)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), 2012-11-08T15:24:26Z.
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Online Access:Get fulltext
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100 1 0 |a Ashlagi, Itai  |e author 
100 1 0 |a Sloan School of Management  |e contributor 
100 1 0 |a Ashlagi, Itai  |e contributor 
700 1 0 |a Monderer, Dov  |e author 
700 1 0 |a Tennenholtz, Moshe  |e author 
245 0 0 |a Simultaneous Ad Auctions 
260 |b Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS),   |c 2012-11-08T15:24:26Z. 
856 |z Get fulltext  |u http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/74596 
520 |a We consider a model with two simultaneous VCG ad auctions A and B where each advertiser chooses to participate in a single ad auction. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium in that model. Moreover, when the click rates in A are pointwise higher than those in B, we prove that the expected revenue in A is greater than the expected revenue in B in this equilibrium. In contrast, we show that this revenue ranking does not hold when advertisers can participate in both auctions. 
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655 7 |a Article 
773 |t Mathematics of Operations Research 

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