論特別委員會於企業併購過程中之任務及權限行使

• Main Author: 吳宛怡
• Language: 中文
• Published: 國立政治大學
• Subjects: 特別委員會; 獨立專家; 企業併購; 整體公平標準
• Online Access: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/cgi-bin/cdrfb3/gsweb.cgi?o=dstdcdr&i=sid=%22G0101651031%22.

現行《企業併購法》藉由獨立專家制度為少數股東之權益把關，但此制度存有一定問題，諸如會計師、律師、證券承銷商是否對相關產業有足夠了解或具備財務專業性、獨立性並未明文規範、由經營階層聘僱，可能無法獨立客觀為少數股東權益把關、未明定追究責任規範，股東無法直接以委任關係追究債務不履行責任、專家之功能角色僅在提供建議意見，欠缺其他相關權限。因為以上眾多之問題，此次《修正草案》參考美國判例及香港法規範，引進特別委員會制度。 　　特別委員會為美國公司治理法制下發展出來之產物，通常由獨立董事組成，故本文比較各國引進美國公司治理模式之規範與運作，藉由比較法上之適用點出我國引進獨立董事及功能性委員會後所存在之相關問題。各國引進特別委員會與獨立董事制度後之運作，牽涉到原先美國法下一元制模式、各國原先之公司治理模式及引進時法規所作之相應調整。惟我國《證券交易法》於引進美國獨立董事與審計委員會制度時，並未因地制宜規範，亦未一併引進幾種重要的功能性委員會或調整董事會之定位，導致配合二元並列制適用時產生諸多問題及監督權與經營權間之權限矛盾，而這些問題某程度上也牽涉到特別委員會制度之運作。 　　本文透過研究特別委員會於美國法及其他比較法上之角色與運作，再與我國法加以比較分析，但我國《修正草案》規範之特別委員會制度實際上與美國判例法發展出來之制度有極大落差。於美國實務運作之下，特別委員會並非強制之機關，其適用之功能，僅於董事具有利益衝突之情況下，藉由具有足夠談判權限之特別委員會代表公司與相對人交易，以降低事後追究責任之司法審查標準，藉以使董事及控制股東通過受任人義務之審查。而我國藉《修正草案》強制設置特別委員會，但漏未規範未設置之法律效果，未表明設置特別委員會對司法審查標準之影響，亦未將相關權限授予委員會。 　　進而，本文分析特別委員會於引進我國後之規範目的、角色定位與功能、權限規範、設置架構及相關問題。《修正草案》係以特別委員會作為一「中立客觀之機關」之角色以控管企業併購對價與程序之公平合理性，但法規僅使特別委員會審議獨立專家意見再提報董事會及股東會，並未賦予特別委員會對外積極談判併購條件、拒絕交易或積極尋覓其他可提供更好條件之併購對象之權，亦未明文規範未設置或設置卻存有瑕疵之法律效果，而無法給予公司經營階層足夠動機依法設置特別委員會。《修正草案》將特別委員會制度依公司是否設置審計委員會而劃分兩種不同之架構，因此依據原先審計委員會之規範，會使兩種架構之委員會具備不同之權限與效果。而《修正草案》與原先獨立專家制度之差異在於以「雙層架構」之方式藉由特別委員會聘任獨立專家，取代原本由董事會聘僱之專家意見，似是認為具利益衝突之董事會所聘僱之專家無法完全公平為全體股東考量，須由獨立董事或不具利害關係人組成之特別委員會聘任獨立專家，才會排除利益衝突之問題而為公司整體利益進行審酌。總之，本文欲藉由比較分析，探究目前《修正草案》之規範是否較原先獨立專家制度更佳而更能達成保障少數股東之效。 === 　　According to the "Business Mergers and Acquisitions Act (the Act)", in order to protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders, the corporations are under an obligation to appoint the independent experts, to ensure the reasonableness and equity of mergers and acquisitions. However, there are some problems in this system as follows. First, the independent experts do not be required to have sufficient experiences of the relevant industry or financial expertise. Second, the Act does not specifically regulate the important condition of independence. Third, independent experts are appointed by the management, so they may not be independent and objective enough. Fourth, the shareholders cannot directly sue the independent experts for their dereliction of duty. Finally, the experts are limited to provide non-compulsory advices, but are lack of other relevant authrity. Because of those problems, the "Amended Draft of the Business Mergers and Acquisitions Act (the Amended Draft)", referring to the Common Law of United states and the regulations of Hong Kong, introduces the Special Committee system. 　　The Special Committees system is originated from the corporate governance legal system of the United States. They are usually composed of Independent Directors. By means of comparing the introduction and operation of American corporate governance model in other countries, this essay tries to point out some native problems relating to Independent Directors and Functional Committees in our country, which are introduced from the United States as well. Other countries adjusted the regulations and operation of Independent Directors and Functional Committees to tie in the original corporate governance system. On the contrary, our country merely amended the "Securities and Exchange Act" introducing Independent Directors and Audit Committee system, not re-orientated the Board of Directors nor introduced other important Functional Committees. It results in many conflictions and dilemmas between management power and supervisory authority. And those problems also influence the operation of the Special Committees. 　　By means of researching the operation of the Special Committee in the United States and other countries as well as comparing them with our country, this essay considers there is an enormous diversity between the Special Committee in the Amended Draft and the common law of the United States. In case of practical operation in the United States, the Special Committee is not an essential institution. When directors have conflict of interests, the Board of Directors can determine to organize the Special Committee and sufficiently entitle it to transact with the counterpart on behalf of the corporation. By doing so, the court would lower the standards of judicial review, the directors and controlling shareholders could get through the review of fiduciary duties. On the other hand, the Special Committee in the Amended Draft is an essential institution as soon as mergers and requisitions start going. However, the Amended Draft does not regulate the legal effect of violation. It does not show what the influence of setting up the Special Committee on the standards of judicial review is. It does not even authorize the Special Committee to handle relevant affairs. 　　Furthermore, this essay analyzes the purpose, function and role, authority, organization and related issues of the Special Committee in the Amended Draft. The Special Committee acts as a "neutral and objective institution" to make sure the reasonableness and equity of mergers and acquisitions. However, it is unable to negotiate the conditions of transaction with the counterpart, refuse the deal or look for another better counterpart. It is only entitled to make a report to the Board of Directors and shareholders after investigating the opinions from the Independent Experts. And because the Amended Draft has no binding effects of violation, the Board of Directors is less motivated to set up the Special Committee. According to the Amended Draft, the authority and effect of the Special Committee are separated into two kinds by whether there is an Audit Committee inside the corporation or not. In terms of the appointment of the Independent Experts, the difference between the Amended Draft and the Act is the double-layer structure. This design allows the Special Committee to appoint the Independent Experts in place of the Board of Directors. It seems that only when Independent Experts are appointed by the Special Committee consisting of Independent Directors or non-stakeholders could they eliminate the conflict of interests in the business transactions and guarantee the whole corporative interests. In conclusion, by means of comparison and analysis, this essay tries to figure out whether the Amended Draft is better and more efficient in protecting minority shareholders than the Act.