Resolving the Complexity of Some Fundamental Problems in Computational Social Choice

Resolving the Complexity of Some Fundamental Problems in Computational Social Choice

In many real world situations, especially involving multiagent systems and artificial intelligence, participating agents often need to agree upon a common alternative even if they have differing preferences over the available alternatives. Voting is one of the tools of choice in these situations. Co...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Dey, Palash
Other Authors: Narahari, Y
Language:en_US
Published: 2017
Subjects:
Computational Social Choice
Election Control
Election Winner Determination
Voter Preference Elicitation
Voting
Possible Winner
Voting Theory
Kernelization Complexity
Coalitional Manipulation
Parameterized Complexity
Computational Complexity
Frugal Bribery in Voting
Computer Science
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/2005/2923
http://etd.ncsi.iisc.ernet.in/abstracts/3785/G28223-Abs.pdf

Internet

http://hdl.handle.net/2005/2923
http://etd.ncsi.iisc.ernet.in/abstracts/3785/G28223-Abs.pdf

Similar Items