The Effects of Team-Based Pay and Financial Incentives on the Team Performance from the Perspectives of Organizational Justice

• Main Authors: Shu-Jung Lai, 賴淑蓉
• Other Authors: Yeun-Wen Chang
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2004
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/79247342708409710410

碩士 === 靜宜大學 === 會計學系研究所 === 92 === Organizations are increasingly to adopt teams to improve the productivity, but there are few researches investigate the effects of compensation systems and financial incentives on the team management. So the major research questions of this study including: (1) to investigate the effect of piece-rate, quota and tournament scheme on the performance of team, (2) to discuss the effect of distribution justice and procedural justice in the team-based pay systems. Subjects are 540 students who major in accounting and be assigned randomly to the experimental conditions. The subjects are asked to perform an experimental task about translating symbols into letters of the alphabet. The experimental employ 2×3×3 between-subjects design. The manipulation independent variables of this study include the type of incentive schemes (quota scheme, piece-rate scheme, and tournament scheme), distribution justice (average, weight), and procedural justice (low, average and weight). The proxies of team performance are including task performance, receptivity of team-based pay and team loyalty. 　 Results of this study are including: (1) the performance of team under distribution justice with adopting weight conditions are higher than average conditions, (2) the performance of team is higher when procedural justice is higher, and (3) the financial incentive schemes have different effects on the receptivity of team-based pay and team loyalty, but haven’t significant difference on the task performance. Although the effect of financial incentives on the task performance don’t have significant differences, but the task performance under quota scheme is higher than piece-rate and tournament.