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碩士 === 國立中山大學 === 企業管理學系研究所 === 96 === Executive Stock Option (ESOs) is the most prevailing encouragement system in the United States. Until the amended Securities Law ξ28-Ⅱ and III in July, 2000, the most popular encouragement system in Taiwan is Employee Stock Bonus (ESBs). After introducing the...
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ndltd-TW-096NSYS51210232019-05-15T19:18:43Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/5bfceq None 高階主管認股權與盈餘管理-以上市櫃電子業為例 Ming-hsiu Hsieh 謝明修 碩士 國立中山大學 企業管理學系研究所 96 Executive Stock Option (ESOs) is the most prevailing encouragement system in the United States. Until the amended Securities Law ξ28-Ⅱ and III in July, 2000, the most popular encouragement system in Taiwan is Employee Stock Bonus (ESBs). After introducing the ESOs in 2000, Vanguard International Semiconductor Corporation (VIS) is the first company to implement the ESOs in February, 2001. Taiwan’s Companies start to implement the ESOs one after another after VIS’s adoption. ESOs are an encouragement system for companies. However, the company management might use earnings management on account of self-interests to increase the value of stock options they owned. The issuance of ESOs can’t increase the profit of the corporate in this situation. On the contrary, it becomes a motivation of the management to manipulate the earnings. This research is about three topics between ESOs and earnings management and the targets are the Taiwan listed electronic companies from year 2001 to year 2005. This study is mainly about three issues of the relations about ESOs and Earnings Management in Taiwan listed companies in the time between 2001 and 2005. First, if companies that grant ESOs would come up more earnings management over time in the lock-up period. Second, if companies that grant ESOs would come up more earnings management than those that don’t grant ESOs when the lock-up period ends. Finally, this study is about the relations between the volume of ESOs and the earnings management. The experiment findings conclude that companies that issue ESOs have the lowest earnings management level at the year of issuance and the highest level at the year of the end of the lock-up period. Comparing with the companies that don’t issue ESOs, companies that issue ESOs have higher earnings management level. Finally, this study concludes that the amount of the ESOs doesn’t affect the earnings management significantly. Ruey-Dang Chang 張瑞當 2008 學位論文 ; thesis 49 zh-TW |
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碩士 === 國立中山大學 === 企業管理學系研究所 === 96 === Executive Stock Option (ESOs) is the most prevailing encouragement system in the United States. Until the amended Securities Law ξ28-Ⅱ and III in July, 2000, the most popular encouragement system in Taiwan is Employee Stock Bonus (ESBs). After introducing the ESOs in 2000, Vanguard International Semiconductor Corporation (VIS) is the first company to implement the ESOs in February, 2001. Taiwan’s Companies start to implement the ESOs one after another after VIS’s adoption.
ESOs are an encouragement system for companies. However, the company management might use earnings management on account of self-interests to increase the value of stock options they owned. The issuance of ESOs can’t increase the profit of the corporate in this situation. On the contrary, it becomes a motivation of the management to manipulate the earnings. This research is about three topics between ESOs and earnings management and the targets are the Taiwan listed electronic companies from year 2001 to year 2005. This study is mainly about three issues of the relations about ESOs and Earnings Management in Taiwan listed companies in the time between 2001 and 2005. First, if companies that grant ESOs would come up more earnings management over time in the lock-up period. Second, if companies that grant ESOs would come up more earnings management than those that don’t grant ESOs when the lock-up period ends. Finally, this study is about the relations between the volume of ESOs and the earnings management.
The experiment findings conclude that companies that issue ESOs have the lowest earnings management level at the year of issuance and the highest level at the year of the end of the lock-up period. Comparing with the companies that don’t issue ESOs, companies that issue ESOs have higher earnings management level. Finally, this study concludes that the amount of the ESOs doesn’t affect the earnings management significantly.
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author2 |
Ruey-Dang Chang |
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Ruey-Dang Chang Ming-hsiu Hsieh 謝明修 |
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Ming-hsiu Hsieh 謝明修 |
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Ming-hsiu Hsieh 謝明修 None |
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Ming-hsiu Hsieh |
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2008 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/5bfceq |
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