The Optimum Channel Strategy for Airline Ticketing
碩士 === 臺中技術學院 === 流通管理系碩士班 === 98 === ABSTRACT Purpose – To benefit a company itself, adopting an appropriate channel selection strategy has become a significant marketing tool nowadays. According to other studies, it has been indicated that the retail industry is stressing on channel selection str...
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ndltd-TW-098NTTI56910092019-09-24T03:34:02Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/hbnt59 The Optimum Channel Strategy for Airline Ticketing 航空票務的最適通路策略選擇 Sheng-Fang Huang 黃聖方 碩士 臺中技術學院 流通管理系碩士班 98 ABSTRACT Purpose – To benefit a company itself, adopting an appropriate channel selection strategy has become a significant marketing tool nowadays. According to other studies, it has been indicated that the retail industry is stressing on channel selection strategy; moreover, due to timeliness in air travel, airlines in order to sell tickets efficiently need to utilize the channel selection strategy more than the retail industry does. Besides, other than ticketing, airlines should contemplate the tickets substitutability and the franchisee substitutability so that they can prevent themselves from channel conflict, which would lead to profit deterioration towards both airlines and franchisees if happened. As a result, this study is focusing on this ticking issue between airlines and franchisees, and then recommending the most accessible channel selection strategy. Design/methodology/approach – This study first assumed a situation in a duopoly market. Under this assumption, there have been three profit models of channel strategy developed: 1) ticketing by an airlines company, 2) ticketing by various franchisees authorized by two airlines, and 3) ticketing by one franchisee authorized by two airlines. Secondly, Stackelberg’s game theory was managed to determine the equilibrium values of wholesale price, retailer price, and marketing costs. Finally, using the equilibrium values would interpret the different circumstances in profit models. Findings – The results from this study indicate that airlines under different circumstances would be likely to make various profits through diverse channel strategies. In consignment relationship, the number of marketing costs that the channel members have to burden is depending on a variety of marketing conditions and channel structures. Furthermore, the marketing costs are significantly associated with profits and sold tickets. Research/Practical implication – The research aims to furnish airlines with the optimum channel selection strategy in order to overcome different rivals and different circumstances. Originality/value – This study has added marketing costs into the profit models that would diversify decisions towards game theory. 陳彥匡 2010 學位論文 ; thesis 71 zh-TW |
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碩士 === 臺中技術學院 === 流通管理系碩士班 === 98 === ABSTRACT
Purpose – To benefit a company itself, adopting an appropriate channel selection strategy has become a significant marketing tool nowadays. According to other studies, it has been indicated that the retail industry is stressing on channel selection strategy; moreover, due to timeliness in air travel, airlines in order to sell tickets efficiently need to utilize the channel selection strategy more than the retail industry does. Besides, other than ticketing, airlines should contemplate the tickets substitutability and the franchisee substitutability so that they can prevent themselves from channel conflict, which would lead to profit deterioration towards both airlines and franchisees if happened. As a result, this study is focusing on this ticking issue between airlines and franchisees, and then recommending the most accessible channel selection strategy.
Design/methodology/approach – This study first assumed a situation in a duopoly market. Under this assumption, there have been three profit models of channel strategy developed: 1) ticketing by an airlines company, 2) ticketing by various franchisees authorized by two airlines, and 3) ticketing by one franchisee authorized by two airlines. Secondly, Stackelberg’s game theory was managed to determine the equilibrium values of wholesale price, retailer price, and marketing costs. Finally, using the equilibrium values would interpret the different circumstances in profit models.
Findings – The results from this study indicate that airlines under different circumstances would be likely to make various profits through diverse channel strategies. In consignment relationship, the number of marketing costs that the channel members have to burden is depending on a variety of marketing conditions and channel structures. Furthermore, the marketing costs are significantly associated with profits and sold tickets.
Research/Practical implication – The research aims to furnish airlines with the optimum channel selection strategy in order to overcome different rivals and different circumstances.
Originality/value – This study has added marketing costs into the profit models that would diversify decisions towards game theory.
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author2 |
陳彥匡 |
author_facet |
陳彥匡 Sheng-Fang Huang 黃聖方 |
author |
Sheng-Fang Huang 黃聖方 |
spellingShingle |
Sheng-Fang Huang 黃聖方 The Optimum Channel Strategy for Airline Ticketing |
author_sort |
Sheng-Fang Huang |
title |
The Optimum Channel Strategy for Airline Ticketing |
title_short |
The Optimum Channel Strategy for Airline Ticketing |
title_full |
The Optimum Channel Strategy for Airline Ticketing |
title_fullStr |
The Optimum Channel Strategy for Airline Ticketing |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Optimum Channel Strategy for Airline Ticketing |
title_sort |
optimum channel strategy for airline ticketing |
publishDate |
2010 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/hbnt59 |
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