The Inuence of Vindictive bidders forNon-decreasing Repeated SponsoredSearch Auctions

碩士 === 國立中正大學 === 資訊工程研究所 === 99 === The subject investigated in this thesis is Non-Decreasing Repeated Sponsored Search Auction (NDRSSA), a mechanism modified from GSP, due to GSP’s non-truthful weakness. But in GSP, bidders still increase their bids maliciously, that causes competitors to spend mo...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: WeiLun Chen, 陳瑋倫
Other Authors: SingLing Lee
Format: Others
Language:en_US
Published: 2011
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/36696491094393857889
Description
Summary:碩士 === 國立中正大學 === 資訊工程研究所 === 99 === The subject investigated in this thesis is Non-Decreasing Repeated Sponsored Search Auction (NDRSSA), a mechanism modified from GSP, due to GSP’s non-truthful weakness. But in GSP, bidders still increase their bids maliciously, that causes competitors to spend more money. Therefore, the present thesis has simulated different vindictive behaviors in NDRSSA and studied the impact between vindictive behaviors and revenue for search engine and bidders. The results showed that different MIP strategies do not prevent the influence of vindictive behaviors to the search engine revenue and the profit of vindictive bidders. However, bidders get more profits by bidding vindictively. Moreover, the influence of conservative vindictive behavior or selective vindictive behavior is highly related to vindictive bidders’ valuations and their positions.