Corporate Governance, Pay-Performance Sensitivity, and the Incentive Pay: Evidence from China
碩士 === 輔仁大學 === 金融與國際企業學系金融碩士班 === 102 === This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on two types of managerial compensation, cash compensation and incentive compensation. Our analysis is based on managerial compensation in China’s public traded firms from 2003 to 2012.We also use match...
Main Authors: | , |
---|---|
Other Authors: | |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
2014
|
Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/16236102368033468831 |
id |
ndltd-TW-102FJU00214016 |
---|---|
record_format |
oai_dc |
spelling |
ndltd-TW-102FJU002140162016-02-21T04:27:05Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/16236102368033468831 Corporate Governance, Pay-Performance Sensitivity, and the Incentive Pay: Evidence from China 公司治理、管理者薪酬績效敏感度與權益薪酬關係之探討-以中國為例 Chen, Kuan-Pei 陳冠蓓 碩士 輔仁大學 金融與國際企業學系金融碩士班 102 This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on two types of managerial compensation, cash compensation and incentive compensation. Our analysis is based on managerial compensation in China’s public traded firms from 2003 to 2012.We also use matched sample on 198 company which using stock incentive pay from 2006 to 2012. We find that the excess control right is positively related to both types of managerial compensation, and is negatively related to the pay-performance sensitivity. Moreover, managerial compensation is positively correlated to accounting performance in state controlled company, while managerial compensation is positively correlated to market performance in non-state controlled company. This paper also prove that managerial compensation is positively correlated to accounting performance before the split share structure reform while correlated to market performance after the split share structure reform. Shu, Pei-Gi 許培基 2014 學位論文 ; thesis 31 zh-TW |
collection |
NDLTD |
language |
zh-TW |
format |
Others
|
sources |
NDLTD |
description |
碩士 === 輔仁大學 === 金融與國際企業學系金融碩士班 === 102 === This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on two types of managerial compensation, cash compensation and incentive compensation. Our analysis is based on managerial compensation in China’s public traded firms from 2003 to 2012.We also use matched sample on 198 company which using stock incentive pay from 2006 to 2012.
We find that the excess control right is positively related to both types of managerial compensation, and is negatively related to the pay-performance sensitivity. Moreover, managerial compensation is positively correlated to accounting performance in state controlled company, while managerial compensation is positively correlated to market performance in non-state controlled company. This paper also prove that managerial compensation is positively correlated to accounting performance before the split share structure reform while correlated to market performance after the split share structure reform.
|
author2 |
Shu, Pei-Gi |
author_facet |
Shu, Pei-Gi Chen, Kuan-Pei 陳冠蓓 |
author |
Chen, Kuan-Pei 陳冠蓓 |
spellingShingle |
Chen, Kuan-Pei 陳冠蓓 Corporate Governance, Pay-Performance Sensitivity, and the Incentive Pay: Evidence from China |
author_sort |
Chen, Kuan-Pei |
title |
Corporate Governance, Pay-Performance Sensitivity, and the Incentive Pay: Evidence from China |
title_short |
Corporate Governance, Pay-Performance Sensitivity, and the Incentive Pay: Evidence from China |
title_full |
Corporate Governance, Pay-Performance Sensitivity, and the Incentive Pay: Evidence from China |
title_fullStr |
Corporate Governance, Pay-Performance Sensitivity, and the Incentive Pay: Evidence from China |
title_full_unstemmed |
Corporate Governance, Pay-Performance Sensitivity, and the Incentive Pay: Evidence from China |
title_sort |
corporate governance, pay-performance sensitivity, and the incentive pay: evidence from china |
publishDate |
2014 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/16236102368033468831 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT chenkuanpei corporategovernancepayperformancesensitivityandtheincentivepayevidencefromchina AT chénguānbèi corporategovernancepayperformancesensitivityandtheincentivepayevidencefromchina AT chenkuanpei gōngsīzhìlǐguǎnlǐzhěxīnchóujīxiàomǐngǎndùyǔquányìxīnchóuguānxìzhītàntǎoyǐzhōngguówèilì AT chénguānbèi gōngsīzhìlǐguǎnlǐzhěxīnchóujīxiàomǐngǎndùyǔquányìxīnchóuguānxìzhītàntǎoyǐzhōngguówèilì |
_version_ |
1718193329538072576 |