Corporate Governance, Pay-Performance Sensitivity, and the Incentive Pay: Evidence from China

• Main Authors: Chen, Kuan-Pei, 陳冠蓓
• Other Authors: Shu, Pei-Gi
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2014
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/16236102368033468831

碩士 === 輔仁大學 === 金融與國際企業學系金融碩士班 === 102 === This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on two types of managerial compensation, cash compensation and incentive compensation. Our analysis is based on managerial compensation in China’s public traded firms from 2003 to 2012.We also use matched sample on 198 company which using stock incentive pay from 2006 to 2012. We find that the excess control right is positively related to both types of managerial compensation, and is negatively related to the pay-performance sensitivity. Moreover, managerial compensation is positively correlated to accounting performance in state controlled company, while managerial compensation is positively correlated to market performance in non-state controlled company. This paper also prove that managerial compensation is positively correlated to accounting performance before the split share structure reform while correlated to market performance after the split share structure reform.