Corporate Governance, Executive Excess Compensation, and Firm Performance

• Main Authors: Fu Ying-Hsing, 傅盈馨
• Other Authors: Huang Pao-Yu
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2015
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/30121205950638536233

碩士 === 東吳大學 === 國際經營與貿易學系 === 103 === This study is to explore the relationships among corporate governance、excess compensation、Institutional investors and firm performance and then derive the following findings. First, the higher director holding ratio、the lower director pledge ratio、no CEO duality and the higher manager and foreign shareholding ratio are, showing the better corporate governance is. And when Institutional investors have more effective supervision way, firm performance would be better. Second, current ratio and debt ratio have negative effect on firm performance. Firm which has relative more capital on current asset and not use it with a better way so that affect its profitability, because of excessive current ratio. But a firm which has too high debt ratio will be risky thus harmful to firm performance. Besides, the bigger the firm scale is, the more risky it can tolerate. The firm relatively won't have cash flow problems when a single year loss, so it has positive impact on firm performance. Third, when CEO duality and director holding ratio get higher, Chief executive will easily get excess compensation because of self-interest. The higher director holding ratio and director pledge ratio are, with corporate interest, CEO might get limited compensation on the contrary. This study results suggest that investors should not only consider financial report information but also consider non-financial information, such as corporate governance、institutional investors、excess compensation for reference of investment decisions.